As Ukraine moves closer to a potential peace agreement with Russia under the leadership of Donald Trump, the United Kingdom and Europe are increasingly focused on enhancing their defenses. The aim is to ensure that any peace deal does not inadvertently embolden Vladimir Putin. In this context, a robust nuclear deterrent is perceived as essential for containing the Russian president’s ambitions. Consequently, attention in Britain is shifting towards the future of the Trident nuclear program.
Two former ministers have expressed to The i Paper that the UK government should explore the possibility of separating nuclear deterrent funding from the broader defense budget. This strategic move could enhance the UK’s resilience in the face of escalating global insecurity. By doing so, a portion of the newly expanded 2.5 percent Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget could be allocated to conventional armed forces and weaponry, while still safeguarding the financial resources dedicated to the nation’s nuclear arsenal.
There is a growing consensus within the defense sector advocating for the upcoming Strategic Defence Review (SDR), scheduled for release this spring, to examine the feasibility of this separation. This consideration arises from the mounting pressure on European nations to bolster their defense funding in light of current geopolitical challenges.
Under this proposed scenario, the MoD would allocate 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027 towards non-nuclear military initiatives, including personnel and conventional equipment. In parallel, the financing for Trident and other nuclear capabilities would be managed directly by the Treasury. While this approach may mean an overall increase in government spending, it raises important questions about potential budget cuts elsewhere, particularly as aid expenditures have already been reduced to accommodate the MoD’s budget increase.
The MoD has indicated that splitting the budget is not currently under consideration in the SDR or government discussions. Some experts argue that isolating nuclear funding from the main defense budget could be counterproductive for the UK, especially given its status as one of only two European NATO countries possessing nuclear capabilities.
The SDR, expected to be published this spring, has undergone multiple revisions in response to the rapidly evolving global security landscape, significantly influenced by Trump’s demands for increased financial commitments from Europe to support both the war in Ukraine and the continent’s defense needs.
The review, led by former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, underscores the UK government’s unwavering commitment to maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent. It will also assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the nuclear program.
Former Defense Minister Tobias Ellwood has long advocated for the separation of nuclear funding from the rest of the MoD’s budget. He argues, “This would illuminate how little of our GDP is actually allocated to conventional weapons and troops—only 1.6 percent when excluding the nuclear deterrent. It would help build public support for increasing our conventional military expenditures.”
Another former minister noted that this separation has been a longstanding aspiration within the MoD, stating, “It would significantly benefit the department. The nuclear enterprise is enormous and costly, with unpredictable expenses. Having it managed directly by the Treasury or the Cabinet Office would allow the MoD to focus its budget on conventional defense management.”
Conversely, Malcolm Chalmers, Deputy Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), cautioned against this approach. He stated, “The government would be undermining itself by not counting nuclear expenditures towards its defense spending goals. The SDR is likely to highlight the UK’s substantial investment in nuclear deterrence, reinforcing its value to NATO.”
Within the MoD budget, currently around 2.3 percent of GDP, funding for Trident and other nuclear capabilities has been ring-fenced since 2023 to protect the deterrent under the Defence Nuclear Enterprise. This arrangement has exerted financial pressure on non-nuclear capabilities.
Additionally, there are ongoing operational costs associated with Trident and other nuclear capabilities, including the expensive replacement of the UK’s four Vanguard submarines with a new class of Dreadnought submarines, projected to cost £31 billion. This figure could escalate to £41 billion, as a contingency fund of £10 billion has been earmarked.
At any given time, one submarine is armed with Trident and deployed at sea, while two others are either in port or engaged in training exercises, and one is undergoing maintenance.
Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the need to future-proof Europe’s nuclear capabilities, suggesting that France may extend its nuclear umbrella to protect its continental allies. He remarked, “I’ve initiated a strategic dialogue regarding the protection of our allies through our deterrence capabilities.”
Simultaneously, Macron cautioned that Europe must prepare for a scenario in which the United States, under Trump, might not remain committed to supporting the war in Ukraine.
UK officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, and Defence Secretary, have recently reaffirmed that the UK-US “special relationship” remains robust, particularly following Trump’s endorsement of Keir Starmer in the Oval Office last month. However, there are growing concerns about the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent if Washington were to completely sever military ties with London.
While such a scenario may seem unlikely, it would pose significant challenges for the maintenance and operational integrity of Trident. The UK maintains full operational control over its nuclear submarines and missiles, although the upkeep of the warheads is a collaborative effort with the United States. Nonetheless, even if Trump were to halt this cooperation, he is expected to be out of office before the missiles require replacement.
