Recent events surrounding the HMS Queen Elizabeth, the £3 billion aircraft carrier, have sparked considerable embarrassment for the UK Ministry of Defence. A malfunctioning propeller forced the carrier to cancel its planned departure for an Arctic NATO exercise last February. This incident highlights not only the operational challenges faced by such a significant investment but also reflects a broader trend of issues plaguing defense spending in the UK. The ongoing saga of mechanical failures—such as a similar problem that caused its sister ship, the HMS Prince of Wales, to return to port shortly after embarking—has raised serious concerns.
The HMS Prince of Wales encountered significant difficulties during its maiden voyage, ultimately requiring repairs shortly after its departure (Photo: BAE Systems/PA Wire). The timeline for these carriers has also been problematic; the decision to construct them emerged from the 1998 defense review, with the first carrier initially scheduled for completion by 2012. However, the project, which ballooned to £6 billion, was delayed by five years and nearly doubled in cost. Alarmingly, some experts argue that these colossal vessels may already be outdated, designed for a type of warfare that is rapidly becoming irrelevant and vulnerable to advanced hypersonic missiles.
As the government prepares to inject an additional £6 billion into defense spending annually—raising the budget to 2.5% of GDP by 2027—it is crucial for officials to brace for potential delays, budget overruns, and further embarrassment. Historical accounts of defense procurement have shown a propensity for waste and mismanagement, including entire fleets of aircraft being scrapped after £3 billion was wasted on a failed refurbishment.
The ‘Perverse Incentives’ of Annual Budgets
A recurring challenge for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the annual budgeting process, which contrasts sharply with the multi-year nature of most procurement programs. Matthew Savill, director of military science at the Royal United Services Institute, notes that this can generate “perverse incentives.” Officials are often compelled to forecast expenditures, leading to counterproductive decisions that can cause delays and escalate costs. For instance, if a department finds itself under budget at the end of the fiscal year, the instinct may be to rush expenditures to avoid a budget cut. Conversely, if a project is over budget, it may be postponed, causing further financial strain and prolonging the life of outdated equipment.
Additionally, the MoD faces challenges in effectively managing relationships with third-party contractors. Tobias Ellwood, a former Army officer and Conservative defense minister, points out that retired generals often work for private firms, creating a knowledge gap. These contractors possess extensive industry experience, while newly appointed ministers may lack the necessary expertise to negotiate effectively. A senior military officer echoed this sentiment, stating, “Civilians are not equipped to do these jobs as they don’t understand our needs, the quantities required, or the real-life challenges of utilizing the equipment.”
When Big Stuff Goes Wrong, It Really Goes Off the Rails
The complexity of defense procurement exacerbates these issues. Savill explains, “When significant problems arise, they can derail entire projects.” The competitive nature of the defense industry, while beneficial in terms of technological advancement, can also lead to rapid obsolescence of equipment. New technologies may render previously procured items ineffective, either through advancements in adversary capabilities or changes in operational requirements.
The £1.3 Billion Watchkeeper Drones: Delayed and Early Retirement
Last year, the government announced the premature retirement of the Watchkeeper drones, initially slated for service until 2042. The project has surged in cost, now estimated at £1.3 billion, well above the original £800 million forecast. Delays stemmed from the challenges of integrating modern technology and regulatory constraints limiting test flights in British airspace. Training incidents, including several drone crashes, have further cast doubt on their operational effectiveness. Additionally, disputes arose over command and control as the drones transitioned to operational status. Multiple officials from the UK and NATO have acknowledged that true performance assessments often only become apparent during live exercises or combat scenarios.
Such missteps in military spending are not new. The Ajax project, intended to deliver hundreds of armored vehicles, has faced significant setbacks, with the first units only arriving this year—eight years after the original schedule. The development has been plagued by issues such as excessive noise and vibrations, raising health concerns for personnel. So far, the Ajax program has exceeded £5 billion in costs, surpassing the initial £3.5 billion estimate, with a review highlighting “systemic, cultural, and institutional problems” within the MoD.
The Wings That Did Not Fit
Another notable failure involves the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, which were retired in 2010 following a poorly executed upgrade program that cost taxpayers £3.6 billion. The MoD attempted to refurbish aging airframes with modern components, including wings, but quickly encountered complications. The airframes lacked a uniform specification, necessitating custom modifications for each aircraft, which substantially delayed the project and increased costs. The cancellation of the program left the UK without maritime patrol capabilities, forcing the government to rely on temporary arrangements with allies until American-made Poseidon replacements were procured between 2019 and 2022.
How the US Left UK Defence High and Dry in 1962
Procurement blunders date back decades, with one of the most significant occurring in 1962 when President John F. Kennedy canceled the Skybolt program, a crucial US initiative for developing air-launched ballistic missiles. This left the UK without a reliable nuclear deterrent and incited a diplomatic crisis. The Skybolt crisis serves as a cautionary tale in procurement discussions, particularly regarding the complexities of defense spending and the implications for taxpayer investment.
Liam Fox, a former Conservative defense secretary, emphasizes the political pressures that often influence procurement decisions, stating, “There is always pressure to allocate spending to British industry, but it’s frequently more cost-effective and timely to procure from allies.” Such dilemmas arise as the current government considers how to balance national interests with international partnerships. Contracts awarded to British firms may bolster domestic employment but could also strain diplomatic relations if they limit collaborative opportunities with allies.
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The exact allocation of the newly announced defense budget remains uncertain. However, the increase, as highlighted by Keir Starmer, is likely insufficient to address the myriad priorities identified by officials and experts as crucial for strengthening Britain’s defense capabilities. Ultimately, the government will face difficult decisions informed by the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, prioritizing what it deems most urgent.
In light of years of underfunding and dwindling weapon and ammunition stocks due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, it is probable that new equipment purchases will top the list of priorities. However, these decisions may only mark the beginning of a series of challenges ahead for the Ministry of Defence.
